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Introduction 
Historians concerned with foreign policy deal by and large with political, 
security and economic issues. The cultural side of foreign policy is a "vast 
and treacherous area"1 in which they do not want to get trapped. It is 
increasingly acknowledged that culture matters in the way· states deal with 
one another, but little is· done, however, to find out how.' This article 
attempts to make some suggestions and introduce relevant literature, mostly 
American, on the subjecL It does not set out to be an exhaustive analysis, 
but merely convey some tentative remmks .. 
Methodological Limitations to the Study of Culture 
and Foreign. Policy 
Why has culture not been of interest to diplomatic historians? One obvious 
reason is that "culture" is such a slippery concept. Anthropologists, whose 
primary area of research is "culture", have wrestled with the concept for 
years and are still far from reaching a consensus on what it is. No wonder 
that diplomatic historians, political scientists and others are hesitant about 
stepping into the quagmire. Other reasons for avoiding culture in the 
treatment of foreign policy are methodological in nature. 
First, to include culture in the analysis of foreign policy usually means 
bringing in untraditional actors. Depending on the posed problem, actOrs 
who traditionally add up to the "foreign policy establishment" must be 
supplemented by such diverse groups as artists, journalists, youth, business 
communities, religious groups, etc. These are tricky, but the overriding 
problem connected to untraditional actors is, no doubt, the treatment of the 
"mass", "general opinion" or "general society". The accumulative and 
abstract nature of the concepts entails huge operational problems for a 
scholar who has his or her mind set on analyzing them. It can be assumed 
2 
Geir Lundestad, The American "Empire" and Other Studies of US Foreign 
Policy in a Comparative Perspective (Oslo, 1990), p. 32. 
Culture is often mentioned as being of great importance, but seldom 
investigated even if it is apparent that it must be highly relevant to the 
posed problem. For an example, see Geir Lundestad, "Empire by Invitation? 
The United States and Westem Europe, 1945-52", Journal of Peace 
Research, DO. 3, 1986, p. 267. 
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that there are collective "dreams", "visions", "prejudices" and "sentiments" 
typical for a nation,' but how does one deduce them? To do that, one needs 
a sophisticated methodological apparatus which, unfortunately, has yet to be 
developed.' 
Second, connected to untraditional actors are untraditional sources. Cartoons, 
magazines, music, art, literature, commercials,. various symbols, export of 
books, TV shows, . statistics of tourist-flows, and "sports", "culture", and 
"leisure" sections of the newspapers; these are but a few examples of sources 
a student of culture and foreign policy may find useful. Those historians 
who would not feel uncomfortable doing studies based on these kinds of 
sources would certainly find them troublesome. 
Third, even studying traditional sources might cause problems if culture is 
included in the search. Concern with culture would, in Michael H. Hunt's 
words, "increase the scholar's burden as archival texts become denser and 
questions of societal context proliferate".s To detect the cultural setting and 
cultural underpinnings of a given foreign policy requires a quite different 
approach to the texts than what is needed in the mere reconstruction of day-
to-day affairs. Some have brought in the concept of "discourse" in this 
regard.· Simply put, the discursive, or linguistic, approach involves greater 
attention to the symbols and underlying meanings of a text. "Self-evident" 
words and phrases like "progress", "democracy", "modernity", "national 
interests", "common good", etc., do not have the same meanings for different 
persons, in different contexts, in different countries, not to mention in 
3 
4 
5 
• 
Akira Jriye, "Culture and International History", in Michael J. Hogan and 
Thomas G. Paterson (eds.), Explaining the History of American Foreign 
Relations (New York, 1991), p. 215; Peter Duignan and Lewis H. Gann, 
The Rebirth of the West. The Americanization of the Democratic World. 
1945-1958 (Cambridge, Mass., 1992). p. 409. 
Frode Liland, De som elsket Amerika. Kollektive forestillinger om Amerika 
i Norge 1945-1949 [Those Who Loved America. Collective Images of 
America in Norway 1945-1949J (MA thesis in history, University of Oslo. 
Fall 1992), ch. 1. 
Michael H. Hunt, "Ideology", in Hogan and Paterson. 1991, pp. 200-201. 
Frank A. Ninkovich, "Interests and Discourse in Diplomatic History". 
Diplomatic History, no. 2, 1989, pp. 135-161. 
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different cultural systems.7 But even though the discursive approach 
encourages greater attention to the hidden messages of a text, which is 
certainly needed, the methodological problems of finding them unfortunately 
still exist 
A fourth and last methodological problem is that the treatment of culture 
very often requires an interdisciplinary approach. The methods and empirical 
monographs in such fields as anthropology, sociology, folklore studies, 
literary analysis and media studies will certainly be of great help and quite 
often be a prerequisite for doing research on culture and foreign policy. 8 
But again, it pUts great demands on the individual scholar and forces him or 
hyr to step out of well-trodden paths. . . 
Links Between Culture and Foreign Policy 
- an OVerview 
The defmitional and methodological difficulties are substantial, but of course 
problems only to those few who are already engaged in doing research in 
culture and foreign policy. A proposition in this article is that the reason 
why culture and foreign policy has received such diminutive attention is that 
many scholars, and laymen no doubt, fmd it hard to see how culture and 
foreign policy are linked in the first place. Probably few will reject the link 
altogether, but many will claim that the link is, at best, of an indirect and 
vague nature. Moreover; some will maintain that indirect links are of less 
importance than direct (such as between security considerations/economic 
concerns and foreign policy). The former assertion is to a large degree 
correct (but not altogether, as will be shown later), and admittedly, to make 
the matter worse, indirect links are harder to detect than direct ones. The 
latter assertion, however, deserves contention. Neither logically nor 
substantially do indirect links have to be of lesser importance than direct 
ones. 
7 
8 
In addition to Ninkovich, 198?, see Hunt, 1991, pp. 194-196, and Emily S. 
Rosenberg, "Walking the Borders", in Hogan arid Paterson, 1991, p. 27. 
Rosenberg, 1991, p. 28. See also John Lewis Gaddis, "New Conceptual 
Approaches to the Study of American Foreign Relations: Interdisciplinary 
Perspectives", Diplomatic History, no. 3, 1990, pp. 405-423. 
7 
A shared conviction among scholars of culture and foreign policy is that if 
one is to understand relations between two countries, it is necessary to 
include in the analysis the societies at large as well as the foreign policy 
establishments. How culture plays a part in the interplay between these 
"actors" can be outlined as follows: 
I (6) (2) Country X society f1J Ba Fotelgn policy 
... (8) establishment (3} 
t (6) + (6) t (4) + 
Country Y society f1J .. Fotelgn fHl/it:y .. (2) establishment (3} 
Figure 1 
The cultural characteristics of any given society (1) are important, because 
the cultural characteristics make up the cultural framework (2) in which the 
foreign policy establishment operates. In other words, culture can be said to 
be a foundation of foreign policy. . 
Culture can also be a part of foreign policy: the formulation and 
organization of cultural policy is a task given to the foreign policy 
establishments (3), as is the cultural diplomacy between nations (4). In 
addition, the implementation and effects of cultural diplomacy in foreign 
countries (5) are most interesting themes. 
Lastly, it is important to note that culture can function as a foreign policy 
resource of its own: the cultural interchange between nations (6) may yield 
power to some countries, foreign culture may have an effect on policy-
makers (7) and they may consequently act as "agents" for foreign countries 
in their own societies (8). 
8 
Culture As a Foundation of Foreign Policy 
A general incentive for studying the cultural foundation of foreign policy is 
the feeling that the traditional approach is too narrow. If a comprehensive 
understanding of foreign policy is desired, then society at large has to be 
analyzed; a wider perspective is needed.9 Accordingly, many studies which 
set out to examine the cultural foundation of foreign policy may be said to 
be of the perspective approach. These studies are normally welcomed by 
traditional "power historians", as they feel power is still maintained as the 
core element. The cultural aspects, they assure themselves, are studied only 
in order to gain insight into what they consider to be the important areas of 
foreign policy: political, economic and security issues. Some scholars of 
culture and foreign policy would undoubtedly feel somewhat uncomfortable 
being embraced by "power historians", as they would sooner insist that the 
cultural foundation is a justifiable area of research in its own right. 
Be that as it may, let us turn to the heart of the matter for historians doing 
research on the cultural foundation of foreign policy: a nation's general 
culture. The task of coming to grips with a nation's culture is tremendous, 
whatever the purposes. It requires a detailed knowledge of the values, 
traditions, structures, tensions, peculiarities, and anomalies that make up a 
nation, but at the same time distance and an outsider's view are useful. \0 
This is, as will be understood, not easy to accomplish. Moreover, there is an 
abundance of theoretical and methodological problems connected to the 
study of a nation's culture. As some already have been mentioned, it may 
suffice to consider questions like: What should the operational objects be -
elites, subgroups or masses? What type of cultural traits is relevant -
traditions, mentalities, art forms? Where should one look for answers -
newspapers, public archives, galleries? These are, however, general problems 
9 
10 
An acknowledgement of this is seen in the wide range of perspectives 
presented in Hogan and Paterson, 1991. For a NOIwegian demana of new 
perspectives in the study of the Cold War, see Rolf Tarnnes, "Forskningen 
om den kalde krigen - status og fremtid" [Research About the Cold War -
Current Status and the Future], forthcoming. Historisk Tidsskrift. 
Frank A. Ninkovich, The Diplomacy of Ideas. U.S. Foreign Policy and 
Cultural Relations 1938-1950 (New York, 1981). pp. vii-ix. 
9 
of doing analysis on cultures, and an exploration of these would go beyond 
the scope of this article.lI 
In the present analysis, a nation's general culture serves only as a framework 
in which the cultural underpinnings of the foreign policy is to be found. In 
fact, our interest is at present limited to the cultural elements which are 
relevant to the foreign policy as conducted by the foreign policy 
establishment. The crucial questions are of course which elements are 
relevant, and in what way? 
Some historians have chosen a comprehensive interpretation of the relevant 
elements and have thus been studying a nation's general history, major 
institutions and basic cultural traits. To them, in other words, the totality of 
a culture is relevant to foreign policy because the two cannot be separated. 
Their explicit goal has been to detect the roots, tenets, basic features, and 
origins of foreign policy. Morrell Heald's and Lawrence S. Kaplan's Culture 
and Diplomacy. The American Experience, and Ideology and U.S. Foreign 
Policy by Michael H. Hunt are good examples of studies of this kind.12 
Heald's and Kaplan's book is a collection of essays covering a broad 
thematic range. American missionaries in China, ethnic politics in the Cold 
War, the Sears and Roebuck enterprises in Latin America, and several other 
actors and themes are included, all with one purpose: to reveal the basic 
cultural traits ofU.S. foreign policy. The concluding chapter winds up nicely 
a series of traits they have found to be the important ones: idealism, 
missionary drive, emphasis on opportunity, the credo of the limited state, an 
isolationist tendency, racism, and anti-communism to name a few. Perhaps 
the most distinct and important feature described in the book, the one that 
separates the USA from most other countries, is the private nature of 
American foreign policy. Until the mid-twentieth century, the authors claim, 
the foreign policy of the USA was mostly an expression of numerous private 
interests, and not a policy carefully and meticulously prepared by 
11 
12 
See instead Clifford Geertz, The Interpretation of Cultures (New YOIx, 
1973), pp. 3-30. 
Morrell Heald and Lawrence S. Kaplan, Culture and Diplomacy. The 
American Experience (Westport, 1977); Michael H. Hunt, Ideology and 
U.S. Foreign Policy (New Haven, 1987). 
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government officials.13 Given this perspective, more insight into American 
foreign policy would undoubtedly be achieved by paying more attention to 
private groups with international interests rather than further studies in the 
archives of the State Department. 
As the title suggests, Michael a Hunt's Ideology and U.S. Foreign Policy 
pays more attention to American ideology than to culture. But for all the 
practical purposes of this article, and in line with the definition of culture 
given by Akira Jriye,I4 the distinction between ideology and culture is not 
vital. "Culture" is here treated as a broad concept which also includes 
ideology. In Hunt's view, there are three long-standing characteristics of 
American ideology that deserve special attention: visions of national 
greatness, a tendency to view the world in a racial hierarchy, and a strong 
opposition to revolutions. According to Hunt, all three date back to the birth 
of the nation (the eighteenth century), have· deep roots in the American 
society, and have been clearly visible in American foreign policy. The latter 
assertion is sustained throughout the book. For example, Hunt reminds us 
that in the Cold War, when the hegemony of America was undisputed, the 
general self-confidence was at its highest. Furthennore, Hunt claims that the 
development policy toward the Third World was an expression of visions of 
racial hierarchy, and that the containment of the Soviet Union was the 
operational expression of the opposition to revolutionary thoughts. IS One 
may object to Hunt's generalizations, but still recognize the pioneering 
nature of his work. 
A somewhat narrower type of studies focuses on the individual foreign 
policy actor or a limited group of actors. The aim is often to construct a 
"cultural topography" based on studies of the cultural environment of the 
actors as well as the actors' cultural outlook. The general assumption is that 
the decision-makers' cultural attitudes and tendencies are of vital importance 
in understanding their opinions, attitudes, decisions and actions regarding all 
aspects of foreign policy. Studies of this kind deal with what has been called 
the foreign policy-makers' "cultural assumptions", "mindsets", "core values" 
13 
14 
IS 
Heald and Kaplan, 1977. 
Culture, !riye says, "is the creation and communication of memory, 
ideology, emotions, life styles, scholarly and artistic WOlKS, and other 
symbols" (Iriye, 1991, p. 215). 
Hunt, 1987, ch. 5. 
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or "general moods".16 Such studies are traditional in the sense that they try 
to explain and understand a limited number of cases, actions or actors, but 
untraditional by doing so with reference to the cultural environment The 
actors under scrutiny may be many or few, the issues marginal or important, 
the policy general Or specific; the common denominator is that all of them 
explain the actors' decisions and actions mainly with reference to culture. 
Two branches of the study of international relations bordering on this, 
concerning "images" and "social-psychological" factors respectively, have 
recognized that in order to sort out the images of foreign policy-makers and 
to analyze their social-psychological fundament, references to culture are 
required.17 Few historical studies explicitly pursue the construction of a 
cultural topography of actors,18 but most traditional foreign policy studies 
include sections or paragraphs where the cultural environment is given 
explanatory power for certain actions or attitudes. Also, authors of political 
biographies actually examine the cultural foundation when they try to 
explain the actions of an important actor by analyzing his or her childhood, 
external influences, turning points of life, etc. 
In this connection, it is worth noting that a number of studies deal with 
domestic cultural influences of a foreign origin that affect the foreign policy 
actors,19 but these are on the borderline of what we are discussing here; 
more will be said of this later. For an indication of the content of such 
studies, consider the title of one of Chantal Cinquin's essays: "President 
Mitterand Also Watches Dallas: American Mass Media and French National 
Policy" ."Dj 
16 
17 
18 
19 
20 
The expressions belong to Rosenber~ (1991, pp. 28-29); lriye (1991, p. 
217); and Herben C. Kelman ("Social-Psychological Al?proaches to tlie 
Srudy of International Relations: Definitions of Scope , in Herben C. 
Kelman (ed.), International Behavior. A Social-Psychological Analysis 
(New York, 1965), pp. 13-17). 
See Kenneth Boulding's classic The Image (Michigan, 1956) and Kelman, 
1965. 
For an example of a srudy which does, see Liland, 1992. 
Liland, 1992, is an example of this. 
Chantal Cinquin, "President Mitterand Also Watches Dallas: American 
Mass Media and French National Policy", in Roger Rollin (ed.), The 
Americanization of the Global Village: Essays in Comparative Popular 
Culture. (Bowling Green, 1989). 
12 
Consciously or unconsciously, studies of the perspective approach, whether 
broad or narrow, very often rest on a premise that foreign policy is a 
reflection of culture: how foreign policy is formed, the underlying reasons, 
and the silbstance are to be found in a nation's culture. For example, when 
Heald and Kaplan recognize and underline the private nature of American 
foreign policy in the nineteenth century by saYing: "Until the mid-twentieth 
century, American foreign policy was the end product of the conflicting 
cultural influences which compose American society" ,21 that is an 
expression of what we may call the mirror-assumption. That assumption is 
not without problems. 
Consider America's foreign policy in the interwar period. The generally 
accepted label is of course "isolationism", describing a policy of detachment 
and reluctance to become involved in affairs outside the U.S. borders. 
However, isolationism is certainly not an accurate account of how American 
culture and business related to the world, quite the. opposite. Emily S. 
Rosenberg and Frank A. Costigliola have demonstrated that America in this 
period was strongly involved with the outside world.22 America's relations 
with Latin-America, Europe and Asia were plentiful and, in terms of trade, 
voluminous. As a matter of fact, the interwar period was perhaps the very 
period America truly became internationally orientated. That is American 
culture, not foreign policy. This reminds us that even though culture may be 
important, as this very article is anxious to show, a direct line cannot be 
drawn between culture and a nation's foreign policy. Power, geography, 
economic interests, and security are of course factors with mighty 
independent weight. Culture can reinforce, contradict, or help explain the 
background, content, or peculiarities of these, but is not necessarily the 
prime agent in the process that leads to foreign policy. 
A sober and, to my mind, more useful way to look at culture in relation to 
foreign policy is not as a mirror, but as a place to look for explanations. 
Akira Jriye is an advocate of this. In one of his articles, he sees power and 
culture as two different systems that are of reciprocal importance, but should 
21 Heald and Kaplan, 1977, p. 10. 
Emily S. Rosenberg, Spreading the American Dream. American Economic 
and Cultural Expansion, 1890-1945 (New York, 1982); Frank Costigliola, 
Awkward Dominion. American Political, Economic, and Cultural Relations 
with Europe, 1919-1933 (lthaca, 1984). 
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be analyzed separately." The foreign policy establishment is primarily 
considering security interests, economic interests, and political interests in 
fonning foreign policy, but the scholar may fmd the legitimation for, and the 
content and shape of the various foreign policies by looking at domestic 
culture. The natural follow-up question, of course, is whether every country 
then has its own unique foreign policy, rooted in its domestic culture. Jriye 
is reluctant to give a blanket answer. He gives examples of American 
foreign policies, e.g. Wilsonian idealism and the corporatism of the 1920s, 
that can be traced to distinctive features in American culture, but is also 
fully aware that culture and foreign policy can be distinctively different. 
Culture As a Part of Foreign. Policy 
The notion of culture as a part of foreign policy is uncontroversial among 
traditional diplomatic historians because cultural diplomacy has deep roots 
and can easily be found in the archives of the foreign ministries. But 
recognizing cultural diplomacy is not to acknowledge its importance. 
Cultural diplomacy has traditionally been conducted by lower staff in a 
negligible department of the foreign ministry and is equally important as the 
visa office. Or so it may seem, judging by the number of scholarly works 
devoted to the subject. Admittedly, there are justifIable reasons for the 
diminutive attention paid to cultural diplomacy. In many countries it plays 
an insignifIcant role, and for all countries, political, security, and economic 
questions are self-explanatorily important. Thus, less important fIelds, such 
as cultural diplomacy, are dealt with in due course when the others are 
exhausted. The scholarly approach to cultural diplomacy may therefore be 
called the incremental approach. 
In short, cultural diplomacy is the creation of cultural activities - often in the 
form of "programs" - aimed at foreign countries, the implementation of those 
activities, or the public aiding, founding or coordination of private cultural 
initiatives aimed at foreign countries. Large programs involving millions of 
dollars made to enlighten foreign audiences through the distribution of 
books, pamphlets and brochures are part of cultural diplomacy. So are small-
scale state-sponsored art exhibitions in a foreign country. The motive behind 
23 Akira lriye, "Culture and Power: International Relations as Intercultural 
Relations", Diplomatic History, no. 2, 1979, pp. 115-128. 
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both, as for cultural diplomacy as such, is usually to diffuse infonnation and 
obtain congenial attitudes in foreign countries.24 
As could be expected, those who do research on the subject have tried to 
upgrade its importance. Many arguments have been given, some not 
particularly plausible. But a few are convincing, for example the one 
underlining that the tenets, major trends or legitimation of foreign policy are 
more easily deduced from cultural programs than other parts· of foreign 
policy, because cultural programs are less disturbed by the day-to-day fuzz 
than other areas.2S Another argument takes the opposite view and claims 
that the knowledge of cultural diplomacy is in itself rewarding and is Iiot 
dependent on the illuminating effect it has to other areas. However, the most 
convincing argument, to my mind, is the one that maintains that culture is 
becoming more and more significant in relations between nations because 
media and mass-communications are playing an increasingly larger role in 
the world community. Akira Jriye has defmed culture in the study of 
international relations as "the sharing and transmitting of consciousness 
within and across national boundaries"; hence, the expansion of the means 
of transmitting "consciousness" will affect, and probably increase, the 
cultural component in international relations.26 Anthropologists, political 
scientists and sociologists have for their part realized that media and 
communication research ought not to be left to media and communication 
expens alone; the communication revolution during the last decades and the 
implications it has on the society is far too important for that. Diplomatic 
historians should follow suit. 
The apparently increasing significance of cultural diplomacy in international 
relations only accelerates the need for historical analysis~ It is conventional 
25 
26 
For an elaboration of this, see J. M. Mitchell, International Cultural 
Relations (London, 1986), pp. 12-21. 
Ninkovich, 1981, pp. 2-4. 
Iriye, 1991, p. 215. He is even so brave as to put fOlward a prediction that 
the importance of culture (with a reseIVation that current trends continue) 
will increase in the 1990s: "For several decades after the 1930s, security, 
strategic, and geopolitical issues were at the forefront of international 
relations T ••. J from the 1970s on such economic questions as natural 
resources, balances of payment, gold reseIVe, and rates of exchanges 
steadily grew in importance I ... J at the end of the twentieth century I ... J 
cultural questions will become increasingly important. In fact, they may 
already have come to overshadow purely economic issues" (p. 224). 
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wisdom - at least among historians - that to understand current trends, one 
must turn to history. Cultural diplomacy has probably played a part in 
relations between nations and peoples at all times, but in modem times 
particularly the Russians and the French have been known to use culture for 
foreign policy objectives. In the eighteenth century cultural diplomacy was 
personal. The disposition of the individual ruler, his or her personal attitude 
to culture, was very importanL The establishment of Alliance Francaise in 
1883 is thought to be he birth of cultural diplomacy in its modem 
institutionalized form. In the early twentieth century, the Geimans and 
Italians were renowned for creating large institutions whose aim was to 
spread 'Die deutsche Kultur" and the blessings of the fascist state, 
respectively, across the world. The British, having of course the colonial 
bureaucracies to diffuse the Anglo-Saxon way of thinking around the globe, 
found it equally useful to establish the British Council in 1934, whose 
purpose was to spread the British language and culture. Z1 
In contrast to their European counterparts, the Americans were largely 
indifferent to cultural diplomacy, and did not have a public administrative 
apparatus for that purpose until 1938, when the Division of Cultural 
Relations was set up in the State Department.28 World War IT changed the 
American attitude to cultural diplomacy. Given the ideological nature of the 
war, ideas were acknowledged to be powerful weapons and money was 
poured into cultural and informational programs. In the Cold War era, ideas 
were not less crucial; consequently, the administrative apparatus of cultural 
diplomacy expanded further. Culture became at last an important part of 
U.S. foreign policy.29 
The lion's share of historians' attention to American cultural diplomacy in 
the Cold War period has been given to domestic administrative struggles, 
policy formulation, the creation and development of institutions and 
programs, etc. A few studies have examined the bilateral relations between 
the USA and a handful of other countries - notably Germany and Japan -
27 
2' 
29 
For this paragraph, see Mitchell, 1986, pp. 22-27, and Duignan, 1991, pp. 
420429. 
The reasons for the late date, may be that the USA was a young nation 
without an "established" culture, had a heterogenous population, and had 
a strong belief in private initiative. 
For this paragraph, see Ninkovich, 1981. 
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and they have been concerned with both the social level and the political 
level. General historical literature on the U.S. cultural programmes has been 
scarce. Considering the substantial dimensions of the programmes in the 
post-World War IT period directed to friends and foes alike, scholarly 
interest has been surprisingly low. It may partly be explained by the general 
difficulties of cross-national and comparative studies and the lack of interest 
in cultural diplomacy as such, but more likely the weighty general problems 
of doing research on the effects of a given policy have been the major 
obstacle. This also sheds light on why Japan and Gennany are exempted 
from the general trend: because they were directly occupied by the U.S., 
they have given scholars the unique possibility of studying the 
implementation, development and consequences of American cultural 
diplomacy. In a way, Japan and Germany were "controlled experiments" on 
the effects on cultural policy. Consequently, they were special cases; insight 
gained from the work done on Japan and Gennany cannot be transmitted to 
other countries without problems. 
Of the few historical works of the general American cultural policy in the 
Cold War period, the best is written by Frank A. Ninkovich.30 The title of 
his book, The Diplomacy of ideas. U.S Foreign Policy and Cultural 
Relations, 1938-1950, is somewhat deceptive concerning the time span, 
because it traces the origins of the American cultural policy decades before 
it was institutionalized. It is accurate, however, in that it examines the 
cultural . relations in view of the overall American foreign policy. 
Ninkovich's approach is quite traditional with regard to sources and 
methodology, but the detailed development of policy and institutions is 
related to the broad cultural characteristics of the USA throughout the book. 
In fact, most of the themes covered by Ninkovich are, despite the American 
setting, of such a general nature that they would have to be accounted for 
in any nation's cultural policy. Let us therefore briefly consider three 
important ones. 
Whether cultural relations with other countries should be a public domain 
or be reserved for the private sphere is perhaps the single most prominent 
issue in Ninkovich's book. As noted by Heald and Kaplan, the general U.S. 
foreign policy until the mid-twentieth century was largely the outcome of 
various private interests. In the cultural sphere, this was certainly the case. 
30 See note 10. 
17 
A private, philanthropic and idealist tradition emphasizing freedom and 
progress prevailed, and the institutions conducting international cultural 
relations, established at the beginning of the twentieth century, adhered to 
this tradition. The Camegie (1910) and Rockefeller (1913) foundations are 
good examples. This is not to say that their policy was in conflict with the 
official policy; on the contrary, it was in perfect harmony with the overall 
U.S. policy of free trade, "Open Door" and modernization. In the 1930s, as 
a reaction to the increasing German and Italian cultural influence in Latin 
America, the Division of Cultural Affairs was established in the State 
Department. All the same, the reluctance to become involved in matters 
which "really belonged" to the private sphere lingered on. The new 
personnel conducting cultural affairs in the State Department were to a large 
extent recruited from the private organizations, and insisted on the separation 
between "national interest" and cultural relations. Cultural relations were not 
allowed to be "politicized". In addition, a large part of the official cultural 
diplomacy was administered through private organizations. In fact, the so-
called "cultural offensive,,3! by the U.S. government was quite meagre.32 
During the war, the need for political control over overseas information 
straight-jacketed the private or semi-private cultural diplomacy. New 
institutions were set up and tight control was imposed over all foreign 
relations, including the cultural; But war is a time of emergency; the 
experience from World War I was that after the war political control would 
slacken considerably. This time, however, it did not. The Cold War and the 
containment of the Soviet Union demanded that not even the cultural sphere 
could be exempted from a coordinated official policy. The realization of the 
need for a public cultural policy in peacetime thus appeared in the late 
1940s.33 The private tradition was strong, however, and only reluctantly did 
the U.S. government create cultural programmes. As it were, the desire to 
avoid politicizing culture turned out to be a futile effort. In contrast to for 
instance the Camegie Foundation, the Fulbright Foundation, established'in 
3! 
32 
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Rosenberg. 1982, p. 202. 
For this paragraph. see Ninkovich. 1981. ch. 1-3. 
It is. of course. a question of interpretation whether the Cold War era was 
a period of "war" or a period of peace. See Fred Inge1s. The Cruel Peace. 
Everyday Ufe and the Cold War (New York, 1991), as opposed to John 
Lewis Gaddis, The Long Peace. Inquiries Into the History of the Cold War 
(New York, 1987). 
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1946, soon became a means of obtaining the overall foreign policy ends: to 
contain the Soviet Union and to consolidate the "free world".34 
A second general theme discussed by Ninkovich is whether cultural policy 
is pursued along national or international lines. The strong idealist and 
internationalist tradition of the early days of American cultural policy rested 
on a belief that international cultural understanding was a precondition for 
peace and world harmony. Thus, culture should not be allowed to become 
a political tool in the hands of politicians whose primary concern was 
"national interest". But as we have seen, in the age of the Cold War idealism 
withered and cultural policy became just another policy of advancing 
American interests. Because of the strong internationalist tradition, however, 
this could not be explicitly acknowledged, but had to be explained away. For 
this task the argument was put forward that American culture and values 
really were universal. Hence, promoting them actively abroad was in line 
with the internationalist tradition. The argument was further sustained by the 
fact that much of the American energy in cultural affairs was channelled 
through UNESCO and the UN. The reality was of course, as Ninkovich 
notes, that the American dominance of the UN and UNESCO made it 
possible to turn these international institutions into harbingers of American 
policy. Quite the reversal of the original idealist and internationalist position. 
The third essential theme examined in Ninkovich' s book relates to the 
dichotomy "infonnation" versus "propaganda". A large portion of cultural 
diplomacy is related to infonnation. Informational activities are of various 
kinds and information is diffused through a series of different channels: 
newspapers, press releases, seminars, pamphlets, shows, exhibitions, 
language courses, radio broadcasting, support of various private initiatives, 
exchange of persons, etc. Information may be directed toward the general 
public, influential "agents" or "opinion-leaders", different segments or elites. 
Furthermore, information can be of a "showcase" or "mirror" type, have an 
overt political purpose or be of a genuine non-political nature. The line 
between pure information and propaganda is a fragile one and, needless to 
say, not easy to draw objectively. The assessment of American Cold War 
policy in this regard has thus resulted in strongly conflicting views. But 
irrespegtive of whether the USA has predominately presented "the truth of 
34 On the politicizing of the cultural programmes, see Ninkovich, 1981, p. 
167. 
19 
America" to foreign countries or is guilty of aggressive propaganda or 
"cultural imperialism", the undisputed fact is that the USA dominated, and 
still dominates, the international information industry. That fact leaves room 
for a series of interesting questions, not possible to investigate here, 
concerning the power of information and dominance in international 
relations.3S 
One question and one general point may be worth noting before closing this 
section on cultural diplomacy. The question is whether cultural diplomacy 
becomes more important in times of conflict than in times of tranquillity. 
The argument that cultural diplomacy becomes more important in times of 
conflict because more energy is put into cultural diplomacy, is of course a 
biased one. The fact that other activities boom as well is then overlooked. 
Security-related questions become· nearly all-prominent and cultural 
diplomacy is reduced to a means of achieving the security ends. One may 
argue, however, that cultural diplomacy becomes more valuable in conflicts 
of values than in conflicts of interests. The American decision to create a 
separate cultural division in the State Department in the 1930s, for example; 
was a response to the fascist German and Italian cultural offensive in Latin 
America. Likewise, during World War n, films, documentaries, radio 
broadcasts and written material were produced in large quantities to promote 
democratic ideals. And in the ideological struggle between the superpowers 
in the post-war period, cultural diplomacy demanded increasingly higher 
resources because it was deemed effIcient to show both the enemy's 
fundamental deficiencies and one's own admirable characteristics. 
A final point is that cultural diplomacy may be more appropriate for major 
powers with global ambitions than small countries with no political 
ambitions outside their borders?6 One of the many reasons for this may 
simply be that resources are limited. Another, and probably more weighty 
factor, is that cultural diplomacy is seen by the big power as a "friendly", 
"peaceful", "harmless" and "positive" foreign policy, suited to accompany 
less friendly, peaceful, harmless and positive power-oriented policies. Great 
,. 
See instead Herbert I. Schiller, Communication and Cultural Domination (White Plains, N.Y., 1976). . 
Exempted from this are pemaps nations distinguished by a special culture, 
e.g. Israel and Iran. Being strongly associated with a special culture, they 
are likely to use that in foreign policy as well as domestic policy. 
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Britain used culture extensively to sustain the Empire, France's standing in 
the world has always been closely related to its cultural reputation, and in 
their struggle for hegemony, during the Cold War the USA and the Soviet 
Union used cultural diplomacy to prove that their systems were better than 
the opponent's. 
Yet, even though small countries may neither have the means nor the 
ambition to promote an official cultural policy, they may still have a strong 
cultural appeal abroad. And such an appeal can have a substantial effect, 
indeed, even become a foreign policy resource on its own. That is the next 
subject we will turn to. 
Culture As Cl Foreign Policy Resource on Its Own 
The questions of whether the "cultural foundation" of foreign policy and 
"cultural diplomacy" are more important or less important than political, 
security and economic matters, are re-occurring among scholars of culture 
and foreign policy. In general the questions are fruitless.37 One pUIpose of 
studying the cultural foundation may be to understand the strength, 
weakness, particularities or shape of whatever rests on that foundation: 
"foreign policy proper" - political, security and economic matters. In that 
case, culture is subordinate. On the other hand, one can argue, as Frank 
Ninkovich does, that 
Although cultural relations are a minor fonn of diplomacy, at the 
same time the entire foreign policy process is itself subordinate to 
hu·ger cultural dynamics [ ... ] a nation's foreign policy is only an 
expression of powerful cultural forces beyond its grasp." 
In that line of argument, culture is superior. But it is also apparent from the 
quotation, when it comes to cultural diplomacy as such, Ninkovich does not 
pretend that it is superior to other forms of diplomacy. On the contrary, he 
legitimizes the incremental approach in the study of American cultural 
diplomacy by saying that the study of cultural diplomacy hopefully can 
37 
" 
Except if the purpose is to rebuke allegations that culture is altogether 
unimportant 
Ninkovich, 1981, p. 2. 
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illuminate political, security and economic issues.'9 Moreover, ifone looks 
at culture as a foreign policy reSOUICe on its own, as we are now about· to 
do, cultural matters may be said to be of equal importance as matters of 
political, security, and economic interest. What may seem a paradoxical 
reason for that is that culture then is analyzed in terms of power, the 
traditional cornerstone of the political, security and economic approaches. 
The study of international relations and foreign policy has primarily focused 
on power. In every standard textbook on international relations, power 
resources which supposedly determine the power of nations are reeled off: 
size, geographical position, population, wealth, military strength, and so on. 
Historians of international relations and foreign policy have done their duty 
and provided thorough empirical studies of such reSOUICes. Neither political 
scientists nor historians, however, have paid much attention to culture as a 
power reSOUICe, even though sometimes culture is actually included in the 
textbooks'lists.40 The few studies that focus on culture as power, therefore, 
really bring an additional aspect to the traditional power reSOUICes. That is 
why we may call this the extra-dimensional approach to the study of culture 
and foreign policy. 
The extra-dimensional approach stems from the proposition that societies 
influence societies. The culture of a nation makes an impact - minor or 
major - on other nations' culture. We may call it interchange between 
societies as opposed to interchange between governments, people-to-people 
contacts as opposed to govemment-to-government contacts, or simply "extra-
political contacts" across the borders. The non-political interchange between 
nations takes place in numerous ways: commercial interchange (trade, 
transportation), personal interchange (tourists, immigrants), media (movies, 
books, magazines, TV), information conveyed through friends and relatives, 
etc. The significance of the various channels may vary over time. For 
example, TV has increased its importance in the last decades, whereas the 
role of radio has decreased. But the overriding fact is that as technology 
provides fast, cheap and simple devices of communication, overall cultural 
interchange between nations expands rapidly. . 
39 
40 
Ibid., p. vii. 
See for example K. J. Holsti, International Politics. A Framework for 
Analysis (New Jersey, 1988), pp. 144-147. 
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In today's media world the large, transnational media networks become 
important actors, not merely channels. In addition, one can imagine a 
development where a few countries can gather a lot of power through the 
control of important media, notably television. On the other hand, the 
multitude of media actors and the complexity of the media situation. can 
make it difficult for one nation to use media for carrying out its interests. 
The questions and scenarios regarding the role of media are many, the 
answers few. What is sure is that the development of the communication 
channels are crucial in understanding the power of Culture.41 
There are great variations between nations in their capacity and willingness 
to export culture, and equally variations in their capacity and willingness to 
receive foreign culture. Furthermore, the effects of foreign culture depend 
on the domestic structures of the recipient nations. In the realm of exporting 
culture, the USA has probably been the most influential country of this 
century. America's non-political interchange with the rest of the world is 
therefore given relatively much attention in the academic community. Two 
good historical works are Emily S. Rosenberg's Spreading the American 
Dream and Frank A. Costigliola's Awkward Dominion.42 Large parts of 
them are devoted to the vast American cultural and economic expansion 
after World War I. Both stress the major impact the expansion had on the 
receiving countries and on the relations between them and the USA. Both 
Rosenberg and Costigliola conclude that the USA may have been isolationist 
in political tenns, but was certainly not so in tenns of culture and economy. 
In Europe, American products of almost every kind were found, American 
managerial and production techniques were imitated, American movies were 
extremely popular, and jazz music and American lifestyle caught on rapidly. 
Two significant consequences of all this were the diffusion of the American 
ideology of "liberal-developmentalism" and the so-called "Americanization" 
of Europe.43 The same labels may be applied to America's role in Europe 
after World War IT as well; Duignan and Gann have depicted the USA as 
the role model for Europe in its struggle for restructuring and modernization, 
and give ample evidence of the "Americanization" of Europe." 
41 
42 
43 
44 
Schiller, 1976. 
See note 22. 
Rosenberg's and Costigliola's labels, respectively. 
Duignan and Gann, 1991. 
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The numerous contacts and conveying of messages between nations will 
invariably lead to people developing various images, attitudes, and feelings 
about other countries. True or false, significant or trivial, the messages about 
other countries will manifest themselves in the receivers's minds as 
knowledge, prejudices, stereotypes and illusions. Some of these impressions 
are . superficial, others lasting and profound; and some will take on a 
symbolic function. 
Several studies have dealt with cross-national images, and many of them 
consider the images of America. 45 One example is my own study on 
Norwegian collective images of America in the period 1945-1949.46 It 
traces the long historical roots of the various images, and ascertains that 
Norwegian emigration to America between 1860 and 1920 had a significant 
impact on the images. Nearly all images found in the years following World 
War IT can be traced back to the emigration period, although they had 
distinctive contemporary characteristics. Three positive images were 
dominant: America 'as an affluent wonderland, America as the modern 
country and America as a land of freedom and democracy. Complementary 
to these were less prominent, negative images: America as a country with 
hidden problems of poverty and apparent ones like the racial issue, America 
as a vulgar country, and America as an imperialistic and predatory capitalist 
country. 
Although the societal impact of general cultural interchange between nations 
and the study of the various cross-national images are intriguing and 
fascinating areas in their own right, 47 they are irrelevant to this article 
unless the cultural interchange has an impact on foreign policy. So let us 
briefly consider what e.g. Donald Duck, Coca-Cola, or Rita Hayworth may 
have to do with foreign policy, and how it matters what people think of 
another country. 
45 
46 
47 
See note 10 in Iriye, 1991. 
Liland, 1992. 
As underlined by several: Iriye 1991, p. 219; Liland, 1992, pp. 7-9; Spencer 
R. Wean, Nuclear Fear: A History of Images (Cambridge, Mass .• 1988). 
p. xiii; Robert Jervis. "The Military History of the Cold War". Diplomatic 
History. no. 1. 1991. p. 98. 
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Ariel DOIfmann and Armand Mattelhart have written an entertaining book, 
How to Read Donald Duck: Imperialistic Ideology in the Disney Comic, in 
which they argue that Donald and other Disney figures were undermining 
the Chilean regime of Allende in the early 1970s.48 The downgrading 
stereotypes of Third World peoples in general, and especially the portraits 
in Donald Duck of Latinos as lazy, childlike, and prone to revolutions were 
in fact felt to be so offending that the popular duck was censored by the 
Allende regime. 
"Coca-colonization" is a concept used by several to describe the impact of 
American products and lifestyle on foreigners.49 In the book The United 
States and the Making of the Postwar France, 1945-1954, Irwin M. Wall 
illuminates the expression by quoting a 1950-dialogue between a deputy for 
the Communist Party in the National Assembly in France and the Minister 
of Health: 
Deputy: "Mr. Minister, on the grand boulevards of Paris. they are selling 
a drink called Coca-Cola." 
Minister: "I know it" 
Deputy: "What is serious is that you know it and yet do nothing." 
Minister: "I have no legislative authorization to act." 
Deputy: "lbis question is not simply an economic question. or even a 
question of health. It is also a political question. One must know whether. 
for political reasons, you are going to pennit French men and women to be 
poisoned. "so 
Anticipating what has been called the "Marilyn Monroe-doctrine",sl the 
Norwegian Social Democratic author Nils Iohan Rud wrote ironically in the 
midst of the heated NATO debate in 1949: 
48 
49 
so 
51 
Ariel Dorfmann and Annand Mattelhart, Anders And i den tredje verden. 
Imperialistisk ideologi i Disneys tegneserier (Copenhagen, 1978). 
[Translated to English: How to read Donald Duck: l'!'Perialistic Ideology 
in the Disney Comic (David Kunzle. New York. 1975).] 
For example Reinhold W~eitner. "The Irony of American Culture Abroad: 
Austria and the Cold War' , in Lary May (ed.). Recasting America. Culture 
and Politics in the Age of Cold War (Chicago, 1989). p. 297. and IrwinM. 
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A NATO does not meet an unprepared people here in Norway. We 
need no change of mentality. The country is prepared l ... ] for the 
politicians and generals. Not only because so many of us have 
relatives in the USA, and that our own tribe is over there. If we do 
not have relatives, we all know somebody there. Not anyone from 
that country is a stranger on Norwegian soil, in Norwegian homes. 
We have for a long time regiuded the Americans as being our 
brothers and sisters: Rip KiIby (by the way, Rip has got his 
Norwegian citizenship under the name of Rip Kirlceby), Tarzan, 
Lyn-Gordon [Flash Gordon] and Rita Hayworth. They are all being 
loved by the Norwegian people, which felt that love long before 
Lange and Acheson became foreign Ministers.S> 
The question of the link between images and foreign policy is discussed in 
Robert Jervis' teview of Spencer R. Weart's book Nuclear Fear: A History 
of Images. Weart's work about American popular images concerning nuclear 
energy and nuclear weapons since the beginning of this century is a 
pioneering book about public images and foreign policy-related questions. 
In opposition to Weart's conclusion "that the images we cherish have a 
greater role in history that has commonly been thought",S3 Jervis says he 
does not believe the public myths to be powerful and autonomous. He 
explains: 
By powerful I mean whether they influence foreign policy, 
domestic politics, social life, and individual psychological well-
being. It seems probable that the size of the effect is in the order 
given, being smallest in foreign relations and greatest on individual 
psychology, 54 
Obviously, there are great variations in the importance of images, and Jervis 
is right in pointing out that few bear any impact on foreign policy. But it is 
highly conceivable, for example, that popular images, attitudes or feelings 
about a foreign country can indirectly influence the policy toward that 
country. At least it can limit the range of possible policies toward the 
country or put pressure on the government to pursue a specific policy. 
S> 
54 
Dagbladet, March 26, 1949. (Translation by F.L.) 
Weart, 1988, p. xiii. 
Jervis, 1991, p. 99. 
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Thus, if popular images, opinions, or attitudes are regarded at all important 
by scholars, it is most often due to the indirect influence they may have. 
That is why the "two-step model" is quite common in scholarly works. 
Behind it lies the assumption that what concerns the general opinion 
concerns decision-makers if they want to be re-elected. Hence the concepts 
of "Gallup-democracy", "weather cock policy" and "pollster-politicians". 
However, the problem with the two-step model is that its proponents. too 
often assume an abyss between the decisions-makers and the opinion. It is 
either implied that the two entities live in separate worlds, or policy-makers 
are completely rational and omnipotent whereas the opinion is prone· to 
irrational feelings and volatile changes. 
Regretfully, the prominence of the two-step model has led to the negligence 
of the importance of the direct influence, or the one-step model if you wish. 
That model stresses that policy-makers are influenced by the same sources 
as the opinion: insofar as the foreign policy-makers are part of the society, 
they are influenced by the presentation of foreign countries through media, 
films, books, cartoons, symbols, etc. The policy-maker will of course have 
access to more sources than the general public, but is still not excluded from 
the influence exercised by the more easily accessible ones. This is a point 
Frank Ninkovich makes in his superb article "Interests and Discourse in 
Diplomatic History" .ss 
The same point is given prominence in my own De som elsket Amerika 
[Those Who Loved America).S6 The study puts forward the idea that foreign 
policy-makers exist within a "cultural-ideological framework" that shapes 
their attitudes and influences their actions. In looking at the prevailing 
images of America in the governing Labor Party in the crucial years 1945-
1949, the study concludes that the positive images of America as a rich and 
prosperous country, a modern country with the future on its side, and as the 
principal guarantor of democracy and freedom, helped overcome the. doubts 
about entering into a military alliance with the principal capitalist country 
of the world. The decisive argument was perhaps based on political and 
strategic calculations, but the positive images of America as a culture 
helped, or was to blame for, Norway's entry into NATO: the ardent NATO 
advocates could benefit from the positive images in the public agitation; the 
ss 
56 
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positive images helped overcome the lingering doubts of many party 
members; and after the decision to enter NATO was made, the images 
helped to subdue the opposition to the military alliance. 
The positive images of America seen in Norway after World War n, are 
relevant to what Joseph S. Nye calls "soft power". 57 Soft power is different 
from many other forms of power because it is a "co-optive power": "the 
ability of a country to structure a situation so that other countries develop 
preferences or defme their interests in ways consistent with its own". 58 The 
means of achieving this are "intangible power resources such as culture, 
ideology end institutions".59 Especially central are "CUltural and ideological 
attraction as well as rules and institutions of international regimes. ,,60 There 
is actually a quite simple principle behind "soft power": "If a state can make 
its power legitimate in the eyes of others, it will encounter less resistance to 
its wishes. If the culture and ideology is attractive, others will more 
willingly follow".61 In this lies the "power of attractive ideas".62 Soft 
power may be working indirectly or directly, it may work without being 
actively assisted by the government, or may be helped by a vigourous and 
flexible. cultural diplomacy. In a world in· which the means of 
communications are dramatically changing people's visions of other 
countries, cross-cultural interchange rapidly is increasing, and 
interdependence between nations is growing, it is highly conceivable that 
soft power will be an increasingly important factor. 
So far, we have largely concerned ourselves with how culture may influence 
the foreign policy establishment, or how the foreign policy establishment 
uses culture for foreign policy ends. The final point in this analysis is that 
foreign policy actors can act as advocates for a certain domestic culture, 
"agents" for other countries, or as channels for the soft power of other 
57· 
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article "Soft Power", Foreign Policy, Fall, 1990 [1990b), pp. 153-171. 
Nye, 1990b, p. 168. 
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nations. That the foreign policy-makers are advocatesofa certain-domestic 
culture is self-explanatory. That is what politicians do; they represent 
different people, opinions and cultures. It may be unconscious, perhaps, but 
they also serve as agents (not used in a derogatory way) for other countries 
or channels for their soft power when they speak, without political motives 
in mind, on their behalf in a domestic context. 
Let us take a concrete example on how this may work. Martin Tranmrel, in 
1949 editor of the mouthpiece of the Labor government in Norway, 
Arbeiderbladet, had been a leading man in the labor movement for decades 
and enjoyed enormous respect within the Labor party. In an editorial 
advocating NATO membership and entering into an alliance with the USA, 
he used the words "freedom" nine times, "democracy" and "peace" five 
times each.63 There are two possible reasons for that. One is that it 
reflected his own views on what America and NATO represented. In that 
case he may be seen as an agent, or a channel, in fact a very influential one, 
of the soft power of America, notably its ideological appeal. The secohd 
interpretation is that he was a shrewd agitator, which, actually, is an 
established fact, and was convinced that an argument based on the virtues 
of America and NATO would appeal to the public. In that case, he can be 
seen as an active agent on behalf of America, advocating views that were 
very much in line with the image America desired. 
Con.cludin.g Remarks 
The purpose of this article has been to draw attention to the ways in which 
culture and foreign policy can be linked, provide some thoughts about them, 
and indicate a few important works about the theme. Few have dealt with 
the subject, and, subsequently, very little empirical knowledge is available 
to us. But if "good history is as much a matter of providing less than 
definitive answers to difficult questions as it is a matter of answering easy 
questions thoroughly", 64 then one can expect much good history in this 
field in the years to come. 
63 
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Of the three ways of studying culture and foreign policy examined in this 
article, the study of culture as a part of foreign policy is the most 
straightforward exercise. Regardless of the content of a policy and purpose 
of an institution or program, policy formulation and development of 
institutions and pmgrams have some basic features; research into political, 
military and economic matters have provided us with so much insight into 
the dynamics of politics that the incremental approach inherently presents 
the scholar with old and familiar problems and a range of old and familiar 
solutions to them.1\he perspective approach, on the other hand,demands 
more ingenuity on the part of the diplomatic historian, as he/she must divert 
his/her attention from the sharp, definite outlines of the foreign policy 
establishment to the blurred, unknown components surrounding it: "cultural 
framework", "cultural images", "mental maps", "ideology", etc. The general 
society is a necessary, but certainly a troublesome component to bring into 
the analysis. Lastly, the extra-dimensional approach is,·many have come to 
recognize, of importance if one is to come to grips with the dynamics of 
international relations, because it may enable us to understand better how 
culture can yield influence across borders and be a power resource of its 
own. 
Many themes relating to culture and foreign policy are covered in this 
article, but many are completely omitted. For example the effects of the 
emerging global culture, the implications of "global cultural systems" 
interacting with each other,65 and the conducting of diplomatic affairs 
across cultural barriers. Some themes have only been briefly mentioned, such 
as how foreign policy issues can influence the culture of a society. Stephen 
Whitfield examines this in the book The Culture of the Cold War, in which 
he gives a colorful portrait of the anti-communist xenophobia that haunted 
American society in the late 1940s and 1950s, and ascribes it to the 
ideological competition between the USA and the Soviet Union.66 Some 
grand themes only hinted at in the present article are for instance "cultural 
hegemony" and "universal values". Some have argued that America in the 
twentieth century has enjoyed, as Great Britain did in the nineteenth century, 
66 
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However, whether it is culture that influences foreign policy of vice versa 
is not always easy to detennine. The classic problem of cause and effect 
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a cultural hegemony that has given the nation considerable leverage. "Soft 
power" is a concept that accounts for some of the implications of cultural 
leverage, but a broader perspective opens up as one introduces the concepts 
of cultural hegemony and universal values. Americans like to think that 
freedom and democracy are the foremost American values diffused under the 
supposedly American cultural hegemony.67 Without taking sides on the 
question on whose ideas they are, it is not too daring to suggest that many 
conflicts could be avoided if values like freedom and democracy were to 
become universal. This is more than merely wishful thinking; such thoughts 
are also put forward on the basis of historical research. That democracies do 
not fight each other is the most well known assertion underlining the 
advantages of diffusing democracy. Another assertion is the one that claims 
that "wars are becoming obsolete" because of the emergence of universal 
values democracy being one of them.68 In other words, ideological and 
cultural factors have consequences of the uttennost important nature: war 
and peace." 
With that in mind, maybe we will come to understand that the most 
significant feature of the Cold War era was not the competition between the 
superpowers, the arms race, or the lingering fear of nuclear holocaust, but 
rather the cultural and ideological interdependency and understanding 
between the Western powers. The foremost legacy of the Cold War, in this 
line of thinking, is thus the diffusion of the ideal of democracy and freedom 
across the globe. 
67 
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As Presidem Clinton put it in his inaugural speech: " •.. our greatest strength 
is the power of our ideas, which are still new in many lands. Across the 
world, we see them embraced and we rejoice. Our hopes, our hearts, our 
hands, are with those on every continent who are building democracy and 
freedom. Their cause is America's cause". (USIS, Presidential text, Jan. 21., 
1993). 
John Mueller, Retreat from Doomsday. The Obsolescence of Major Wars 
(New York, 1989). See also his article "Quiet Cataclysm: Some 
Afterthoughts about World War DI", Diplomatic History, no. 1, 1992, pp. 
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